CASE FILES AND VERIFICATION RECORD

> *This document does two jobs. Part A builds out the evidentiary base for Chapter Six — the population of cases, the coding of each, and the discriminating variables — so that the chapter's method is auditable rather than asserted. Part B records the verification pass over every dated or numerical claim in the manuscript, marking each as confirmed, corrected, or flagged for further work. Corrections marked here have been applied to the current draft.*

PART A · THE CHAPTER SIX CASE POPULATION

Population definition

Every government, between the establishment of a standing American covert-action capability in 1947 and the end of the 1970s, that materially injured a major Western commercial interest through expropriation, nationalization, unilateral contract revision, or comparable measure — whether or not anything subsequently happened to it. Two pre-1947 cases (Mexico 1938) are carried as repertoire evidence, not as preference tests, for the reason given in the coding notes. Two cases with no commercial trigger are carried as counter-evidence.

Coding variables

- **INJURY** — scale of the commercial injury relative to the target economy and to the injured firm.
- **CONTINUING POSITION** — did the injured firm retain an income-producing role (management contract, marketing agreement, minority equity) after the measure? This turns out to matter more than whether compensation was nominally offered.
- **PARTNER** — presence of an organized, capable domestic actor with prior institutional relationship to the United States and an appetite for power.
- **ALIGNMENT** — availability of a bloc patron, and whether the security characterization preceded or followed the commercial dispute.
- **ACCESS** — informal, personal access by the injured party to deciding officials. Largely unmeasurable; recorded where documented.
- **OUTCOME** — covert removal attempted / not attempted.

A.1 Positive cases

Iran, 1951–53

Injury. Majlis vote to nationalize the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company, spring 1951; AIOC majority-owned by HM Government since 1914. The 1950 Aramco–Saudi fifty-fifty settlement made the Iranian terms conspicuously anomalous; AIOC declined to match. British response: embargo, withdrawal of technical staff, closure of Abadan, asset freeze, legal campaign against Iranian crude.

Continuing position. None — total loss of concession. **Partner.** Present and multiple: monarch, sections of the officer corps, mobilizable clergy, bazaar networks. **Alignment.** Tudeh present but Mossadegh not communist; Truman administration explicitly assessed removal as counterproductive and refused. Security characterization *followed* the change of administration, not a change in evidence. **Access.** Extensive, via British government as shareholder and via the incoming administration's own principals.

Outcome. TPAJAX, August 1953. First attempt failed 15–16 August; second succeeded 19 August. **Settlement:** Consortium Agreement, signed 19–20 September 1954, in force 29 October — BP 40%, five US majors 8% each (40% total), Shell 14%, CFP 6%. In 1955 the US majors each ceded 1% to a group of smaller American firms (Iricon, 5%). American firms held no position in Iranian oil before 1951.

Sources: FRUS 1952–54 vol. X (esp. d.432, memorandum of understanding, 9 April 1954); Encyclopaedia Iranica, "Oil Agreements in Iran"; consortium text.

Guatemala, 1952–54

Injury. Decree 900, Agrarian Reform Law, 17 June 1952. Expropriation of uncultivated holdings above threshold, compensated at declared taxable value in twenty-five-year bonds at 3%. February 1953 order expropriated approximately 234,000 acres of United Fruit land near Tiquisate; company appeal denied by Guatemalan Supreme Court, 18 March 1953. Compensation offered: **$627,572**. Valuation demanded by the State Department on the company's behalf: **$15,854,849** — a ratio of about 25:1. UFCo held roughly 550,000–600,000 acres, most uncultivated. Across the whole programme some 1.5 million acres were distributed to about 100,000 families.

Continuing position. None on the expropriated acreage. **Partner.** Present — an officer corps with no attachment to the government it served, which declined to fight. **Alignment.** Weakest of any positive case. PGT small; Árbenz not a member; no Soviet arms until the Czech shipment of May 1954, which the arms embargo had itself induced and which was then cited as evidence of alignment. **Access.** Documented and extensive.

Outcome. PBSUCCESS, June 1954. Árbenz resigned 27 June. Decree 900 repealed; land restored. Subsequent civil war 1960–96; CEH truth commission (1999) documented approximately 200,000 dead, overwhelmingly at the hands of state forces, and found acts of genocide against Maya communities.

Sources: FRUS 1952–54 vol. IV, editorial note (d.420); Handy, "The Most Precious Fruit of the Revolution," HAHR 68:4; CEH, *Memoria del Silencio*.

Brazil, 1962–64

Injury. Profit remittance law restricting annual repatriation; state-level expropriation of an ITT telecommunications subsidiary in Rio Grande do Sul at a disputed valuation; proposed refinery nationalization and land redistribution. Modest by the standards of this population. **Continuing position.** Partial — foreign firms remained operational. **Partner.** Strongly present: large, politically organized, anti-communist officer corps with decades of institutional contact. **Alignment.** Goulart a landowner and constitutional successor; alignment case weak but assertable. **Outcome.** Coup 31 March–1 April 1964, with a US naval contingency package (carrier, escorts, tankers, ammunition ship) dispatched and recalled unused. Military rule to 1985.

Indonesia, 1965–66

Injury. Sukarno-era seizure of Dutch holdings (1957–58) and sustained pressure on American oil operations. **Partner.** Present. **Outcome — and coding note.** This case must be coded differently from the others and the chapter says so: the United States did not organize the killings. It encouraged them, signalled approval to the officers conducting them, supplied communications equipment and other material, and — through an embassy officer who later described doing so publicly — passed lists of PKI names compiled from open sources. Embassy reporting declassified in bulk in 2017 records the scale contemporaneously and assesses it favourably. Estimates of the dead begin at 500,000; roughly a million more imprisoned, many for over a decade, without trial.

Commercial sequel (recorded as sequel, not cause): foreign investment law 1967; a major American mining contract of work concluded 1967; oil sector reopened on terms the previous government had refused — within roughly twenty-four months of a decade of failed negotiation.

Verification note: the list-passing claim rests on the officer's own on-record account and subsequent documentary release. Characterize as attested by the participant and consistent with released cables; do not characterize as the operative cause of the killings.

Chile, 1970–73

Injury. Copper nationalization by constitutional amendment, July 1971, passed unanimously by a congress the government did not control. Compensation formula deducted designated excess profits from book value, leaving the two large American producers with nothing and in one calculation less than nothing. **Continuing position.** None. **Partner.** Present by 1973, though not manufactured: the 1970 attempt to induce a coup required removing a constitutionalist commander-in-chief and left him dead, and failed. **Alignment.** Assertable. **Access.** Documented, including corporate offers of funding. **Outcome.** Three years of credit denial, opposition funding, and media support; coup 11 September 1973. American contribution to the final event is genuinely contested; the chapter does not require it to have been decisive.

A.2 Negative cases

Mexico, 1938 — *REPERTOIRE EVIDENCE, NOT A PREFERENCE TEST*

Total expropriation of seventeen foreign oil companies, 18 March 1938, following the companies' refusal to comply with a Mexican supreme court labour award. Larger and less qualified than any injury in the positive set. Response: boycott of Mexican crude, British rupture of diplomatic relations, sustained American pressure for compensation, ambassadorial argument against coercion, compensation negotiated over several years at figures the companies considered derisory. State retained the industry permanently.

Coding note, stated in the chapter text. In 1938 no standing covert-action capability existed. A government cannot decline to use an instrument it does not have. Mexico therefore tests repertoire — establishing that boycott, pressure, litigation and settlement were a complete and functional response set — and does not test preference. Its value to the argument is to reframe the question put to 1953 from "what else could they have done" to "why did they stop doing what had already worked."

Bolivia, 1952 — *STRONG NEGATIVE*

MNR takes power by insurrection, April 1952; existing army dissolved; worker and peasant militias armed; the three great tin companies nationalized 31 October 1952. Relative to national economy, more radical than Chile. American response: recognition within weeks, then — under the same administration that removed Mossadegh and Árbenz — among the largest per-capita aid programmes in the hemisphere. On-record reasoning: the governing party was containable and anti-communist enough, compensation was offered, and the realistic alternatives (Trotskyist currents, the miners' militias) were assessed as worse. **PARTNER absent** — the army had been dissolved. This case is the cleanest demonstration that partner availability, not injury magnitude, is doing the work.

Egypt, 1956 — *STRONG NEGATIVE*

Nationalization of the Suez Canal Company, 26 July 1956. American response: opposition to, and then termination of, the Anglo-French-Israeli intervention, using financial pressure on sterling to force withdrawal. No case in the period features a larger commercial expropriation met with a more emphatic American defence of the expropriating state. Later hostility to Nasser does not alter the coding of the 1956 response.

Peru, 1968–74 — *STRONG NEGATIVE; MATCHED AGAINST BRAZIL*

Coup 3 October 1968 (Velasco). **Six days later**, 9 October, the Revolutionary Government renounced the Act of Talara and occupied the International Petroleum Company's refinery and the La Brea y Pariñas fields — a subsidiary of Standard Oil of New Jersey — declining compensation on the theory that IPC owed more in back taxes than the assets were worth (Peru claiming c. $690m owed; IPC demanding c. $120m). Subsequent nationalizations 1969–74: ITT, mining, fisheries, sugar, media. Soviet arms purchased.

Response. Hickenlooper Amendment triggered but its formal application avoided; special ambassador (Irwin) recommended against sanctions; aid and multilateral lending curtailed in practice. **Settlement:** agreement of 19 February 1974 — Peru paid **$76 million** to the United States government for distribution among claimants, with a unilateral Peruvian annex listing eligible companies constructed so that Peru could maintain it had not compensated IPC. IPC received nothing. Velasco was removed in 1975 by other Peruvian generals for Peruvian reasons.

Why it matters. Goulart did substantially less and drew a naval contingency package; the Peruvian junta did substantially more and drew lawyers. PARTNER absent: the officer corps *was* the government.

Sources: FRUS 1969–76 vol. XI pt. 2, editorial note d.294; Maurer, *The Empire Trap* working paper (Greene settlement figures).

Zambia, 1969 — *STRONG NEGATIVE; MATCHED AGAINST CHILE*

Matero Reforms announced 11 August 1969: state acquisition of 51% of the copper mines from Anglo American Corporation and Roan Selection Trust, implemented January 1970. Copper was approximately 96% of Zambian exports. Kaunda nonaligned; hosted southern African liberation movements.

CONTINUING POSITION — present, and this is the finding. Terms settled amicably within three months: compensation at book value in state bonds redeemable over eight to twelve years at 6% interest, plus ten-year management and sales contracts paying the companies approximately 1.5% of gross sales and 2% of profits. The firms lost majority ownership and kept an income stream. Compare Chile, where the excess-profits deduction left the producers with nothing. Both were copper; both were the entire export economy; one produced three years of covert effort and one produced a bond schedule.

Sources: Kaunda, "Towards Complete Independence," Matero Hall, 11 August 1969; Bostock and Harvey; Whitworth (2015) on ZIMCO bond terms.

Venezuela, 1976 — *NEGATIVE*

Oil nationalization effective 1 January 1976; former concessionaires compensated at book value on terms they considered inadequate and retained service and technical contracts. Democratic government, OPEC member, aligned. No consequence beyond continued commercial relations. Coding: CONTINUING POSITION present; PARTNER absent; ALIGNMENT favourable.

India, Nehru period — NEGATIVE

Sustained nationalization across insurance (1956), banking, and heavy industry; declared nonalignment; Soviet arms purchases; substantial and continuous American aid throughout, including large food assistance. PARTNER absent; consolidated state with a military attached to civilian authority.

A.3 Counter-evidence: intervention without commercial trigger

South Vietnam, 1963

An allied head of government removed in a coup with American encouragement, against no expropriation, at no commercial party's request, for reasons internal to the prosecution of a war. Whatever explains 1963, it is not the economic thesis. Carried in the population deliberately: a test that admits only inconvenient negatives is half a test.

Congo, 1960–61

Carried with a coding caveat. Mineral interests were substantial and Belgian corporate involvement documented, but the American decision chain is better explained by bloc-competition variables than by a specific injured firm with access. Recommend including as a mixed case and coding ACCESS as not established.

A.4 The coding table

Case	Injury	Continuing position	Partner	Alignment	Outcome
Iran 1951–53	Total	None	**Yes**	Asserted after admin change	Removal
Guatemala 1952–54	Partial (uncultivated)	None on taken land	**Yes**	Weak; partly induced	Removal
Brazil 1962–64	Modest	Partial	**Yes**	Assertable	Removal
Indonesia 1965–66	Prior seizures	Partial	**Yes**	Strong	Enabled, not run
Chile 1970–73	Total, negative comp.	None	**Yes** (by 1973)	Assertable	Sustained effort
Mexico 1938	Total	None	No	n/a	*None (no capability)*
Bolivia 1952	Total, core economy	None	**No** (army dissolved)	Containable	*Aid*
Egypt 1956	Total	None	No	Hostile	*Defended*
Peru 1968–74	Total, uncompensated	None	**No** (officers govern)	Soviet arms	*Settlement*
Zambia 1969	Majority stake, core economy	**Yes** (mgmt + sales)	No	Nonaligned	*None*
Venezuela 1976	Total	**Yes** (service contracts)	No	Aligned	*None*
India 1950s–60s	Sustained, sectoral	Mixed	No	Nonaligned + Soviet arms	*Aid*
S. Vietnam 1963	**None**	n/a	Yes	Central	Removal

A.5 What the table supports

Commercial injury is neither sufficient nor necessary. Six negatives with injuries equal to or greater than the positives; one positive (1963) with no injury at all. The crude economic thesis fails on this population and the chapter must say so in its own voice before a reviewer says it.

PARTNER discriminates almost perfectly. Every positive has one; every negative lacks one. This is the strongest single finding and it means the null hypothesis — that intervention followed opportunity — is not a rival to be defeated but a necessary condition to be incorporated.

CONTINUING POSITION out-performs compensation-offered. Bolivia, Guatemala, and Iran all involved compensation offers; two produced operations. Zambia and Venezuela left the firms with income; neither produced anything. The operative question is not whether a firm was paid but whether it was left with a reason not to lobby.

The defensible thesis. Commercial injury determines *which disputes reach the table*; partner availability determines *whether anything is done about them*. This is a weaker causal claim and a far more damaging institutional one, because agenda capture requires no one to be corrupt — the injured firm is simply the only party in the room with a specific, quantified, urgent request, and specificity is what gets acted on.

A.6 Limitations to keep in the chapter body, not in a note

- **Disclosure is not random.** The population is built from disclosed cases; exposed and failed operations are overrepresented; successful ones may be missing entirely.
- **The denominator is unknown.** Considered-and-rejected operations are almost wholly unobservable, which means PARTNER's apparent necessity could partly reflect what got proposed rather than what got approved.
- **Capability confound before 1947.** Handled explicitly for Mexico; do not extend the reasoning to post-1947 cases without saying so.
- **Documents were written by people who knew they might be read.** Sincerity of security characterizations cannot be assessed from the record alone; the timing test (did the characterization precede or follow the dispute) is a partial substitute and is used as one.

PART B · VERIFICATION RECORD

> *Every dated or numerical claim in the manuscript, checked against available sources. Corrections marked* CORRECTED *have been applied to the current draft. Items marked* FLAGGED *require primary-source work before publication.*

B.1 Confirmed as drafted

Claim	Verified detail	Note
1954 consortium shares	BP 40%; five US majors 8% each; Shell 14%; CFP 6%. Signed 19–20 Sept 1954, in force 29 Oct.	US firms held nothing pre-1951. 1955: each major ceded 1% to smaller US firms (Iricon 5%).
UFCo compensation dispute	$627,572 offered vs $15,854,849 demanded; c. 234,000 acres, Feb 1953; Decree 900 of 17 June 1952.	Ratio is c. 25:1, not 30:1. Figures now stated exactly in text.
Peru IPC seizure and settlement	Coup 3 Oct 1968; seizure 9 Oct; agreement 19 Feb 1974; $76m to USG for distribution; IPC excluded by Peruvian annex.	"Six days later" is exact. Hickenlooper triggered, application avoided.
Zambia Matero Reforms	Announced 11 Aug 1969; 51% of AAC and RST; book-value bonds 8–12 yrs at 6%; management and sales contracts retained.	Copper c. 96% of exports. Settled within three months.
ZunZuneo	USAID; 2009–2012; c. 40,000 subscribers at peak; shell entities in Spain and Cayman Islands; staged plan to "smart mobs"; AP investigation April 2014.	Planning language on renegotiating state–society balance is in the documents AP obtained.
Chenoweth/Stephan	1900–2006: c. 53% nonviolent vs c. 26% violent success.	See correction B.2 on the decline.
Iranian indictment citing Sharp	Show trials from 1 Aug 2009; indictment asserts more than 100 of the 198 steps executed.	Text available via Iran Data Portal. Now used directly in Ch. 19.

B.2 Corrected — applied to the draft

Ch. 9 — the August 1978 Iran assessment MATERIAL

The "not in a revolutionary or even pre-revolutionary situation" line comes from the January 1979 House Permanent Select Committee staff evaluation, quoting a CIA product of August 1978. **The then-Director subsequently disputed its status publicly, stating it came from a draft he had rejected rather than a finished study.** Presenting it as a settled formal assessment was the manuscript's most exposed factual claim and has been rewritten: the chapter now records the dispute and shifts weight onto the Defense Intelligence Agency appraisal of the following month, which judged the Shah likely to remain actively in power for another decade and was not a draft. The argument is strengthened by the change, because two agencies with different sources agreeing is a better illustration of a systemic ontology problem than one document is.

Ch. 12 — Stănculescu MATERIAL

The drafted account had him refusing to send Ceaușescu a helicopter. By his own later account he *arranged* the helicopter, describing it as saving the couple from a mob. Corrected sequence: the plaster cast was self-arranged to avoid orders to fire on demonstrators; Defence Minister Milea died on the morning of 22 December (recorded as suicide after failing to execute such orders); Stănculescu became acting minister that day; he ordered units back to barracks and arranged the departure; he organised the trial of 25 December. In 2008 a Romanian court convicted him over the Timișoara shootings (fifteen years; released 2014). The chapter now uses the cast rather than the helicopter as its evidentiary object and states the conviction, which strengthens the analytical point: expectation is not a moral quantity.

Ch. 13 — Jäger at Bornholmer Strasse MINOR

Time corrected from 11:29 to approximately 11:30 pm. He commanded roughly fifty men, not an unspecified force. The "recording names" detail replaced with the accurate one: he was instructed to admit the loudest and stamp their documents so as to prevent return — which required individual identification in front of a crowd already moving the barrier. Approximately 20,000 crossed in the following forty-five minutes; other crossings followed by midnight.

Ch. 16 — Stasi ratios MINOR BUT QUOTABLE

Drafted as "one full-time officer for every sixty-three citizens" — incorrect. Correct: c. 91,000–97,000 full-time staff (c. 1 per 166 citizens) plus c. 173,000 registered informants, yielding the commonly cited 1-per-63 for *officers or informants combined*. The 1-per-6.5 figure includes occasional and part-time collaborators and is an upper-bound estimate of a contested count. Text now states all three with their qualifications. The "files on a third of the population" claim was removed pending a citable figure.

Ch. 2 — the decline in civil-resistance success SUBSTANTIVE ADDITION

Drafted vaguely as a narrowed margin. Corrected and sharpened: nonviolent success rates fall from roughly 52–53% to roughly a third when the dataset is extended through the 2010s, even as campaign frequency peaked. Chenoweth's own attribution — movement-side thinning (organization, training, strike usage, over-reliance on the internet) plus regime learning, with *blaming foreigners and outsiders* listed among the learned responses — has been incorporated, and now sets up Chapter Eight directly.

Ch. 19 — the Sharp animation DATE

Drafted as following the 2009 protests. The Iranian intelligence cartoon depicting Sharp with an American senator and a financier dates to 2007–2008, i.e. it *preceded* the protests it was later used to explain. Corrected, and the chapter now leads with the 1 August 2009 indictment instead, which is stronger material: a state prosecutor citing a published book's numbered list as evidence of conspiracy.

B.3 Flagged — requires primary-source work

- TPAJAX BUDGET. Figures in the low hundreds of thousands with authorization around $1m are widely repeated but variously sourced. Either cite the specific document or replace with a ratio claim that does not depend on the absolute number.
- ROOSEVELT DECLINING PBSUCCESS. Currently hedged twice with "reportedly." Source it or cut it — the sentence's work (the method no longer depended on the man) survives without it.
- ABADAN HOUSING AND WORKFORCE DETAIL. The characterization is sound and standard, but the chapter's most humanly specific passage should rest on a named study rather than general knowledge.
- BRAZIL TASK FORCE COMPOSITION. Confirm vessel types and the ammunition-ship claim against the declassified record rather than secondary accounts.
- INDONESIA LIST-PASSING. Attested by the participant on record and consistent with the 2017 releases. Fix the characterization precisely and do not let it drift toward causation.
- KABUL 2021 FIGURES. Force size and the eleven-day span are broadly reported; the assessment timeline (what was judged, when, by whom) needs the actual documents, several of which are now available through inspector-general reporting.
- 2002 NIE PRODUCTION TIMELINE. The three-week figure and the placement of dissents are well established in the post-mortems; cite them directly rather than relying on the general account.
- CHAPTER EIGHT STATUTE TABLE. All four entries require checking against current primary texts and amendment histories, several of which have moved recently. The Hungarian instrument, omitted from the table, is worth adding precisely because it was struck down — a negative case for the diffusion argument.
- GUATEMALA DEATH TOLL AND GENOCIDE FINDING. Cite the CEH report directly, with its own language on attribution of responsibility, rather than the widely circulated summary figure.

B.4 Structural changes made in this pass

- **Part II analytical thread.** Chapter Four now opens its historical material by naming the two questions the whole Part is assembled to answer, so the case detail reads as evidence. Chapter Five closes on the co-evolution of bureaucracy and metric — each recorded success lowering the threshold for the next — which hands directly to Chapters Six and Seven.
- **Ch. 18 bridge.** The Serbia/Cuba comparison is now run explicitly through the Part Four machinery: the three quantities of Chapter Twelve applied to each case, and the specific finding that a covert platform cannot supply mutual observation because its participants cannot know who else is participating. The asymmetry is now derived rather than asserted.
- **Algorithmic information environment.** Added to Chapter Sixteen, where it belongs: everything the Stasi did with 173,000 informants is now a byproduct of ordinary platform operation, and the common-knowledge events of Chapter Eleven now propagate through ranking systems that can equally be adjusted to prevent their formation. The mirror problem is restated as a description of existing infrastructure rather than a historical analogy.